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with orders issued after such production. 15 3 Thus, this decision,
by denying enforcement under section 245, effectively frustrates
the provision of section 240 permitting child support orders in
habeas corpus proceedings.
NEW YORK

CCA

CITY CIVIL COURT ACT

§ 201: No jurisdiction to award money judgment for
fraudulent conveyance.

While the Civil Court of the City of New York is given
jurisdiction over actions for the recovery of money where the
amount sought to be recovered does not exceed $10,0001

54

it has

no general equity jurisdiction. 55 This limit upon jurisdiction
is closely adhered to by the court. 6
A recent example of the stringency of the jurisdictional limitation is Circulation Associates, Inc. v. Mother's Manual, Inc."5
There, plaintiff alleged that a transfer to the defendant by the
judgment debtor of its customer lists and contracts was fraudulent
under Article 10 of the Debtor and Creditor Law, since it was
made while the judgment debtor was insolvent. Plaintiff sought
a money judgment in lieu of a decree setting aside the conveyance.
153 CPLR 7006(a) provides that the "person upon whom the writ . . .
is served . . . shall make a return to [the court which issued the writ] ...
and, if required by [the court] . . . produce the body of the person
detained. . . ." This language suggests that only initial compliance with

the writ, i.e., production, is contemplated. This conclusion is supported
by referring to cases under the predecessor of the present section, CPA
§1248. See, e.g., In re Sedgwick, 211 App. Div. 60, 206 N.Y.S. 850
(1st Dep't 1924); Application of Hebo, 95 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct N.Y.
County 1950); People ex rel. Kniffin v. Knight, 184 Misc. 545, 56 N.Y.S.2d

108 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945).
154 CCA § 202 provides that "the court shall have jurisdiction of actions

and proceedings for the recovery of money, actions and proceedings for
the recovery of chattels and actions and proceedings for the foreclosure
of liens on personal property where the amount sought to be recovered
See generally
or the value of the property does not exceed $10,000."
WACHTELL, Nmv Yonx PRACriCE UNDER THE CPLR 8-10 (2d ed. 1966).
155 N.Y. COxsT. art. VI, § 15(b); CCA §§ 202-05; Petrides v. Park Hill
Restaurant, 265 App. Div. 509, 39 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1st Dep't 1943); Kwoczka

v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, 52 Misc. 2d 67, 275 N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. 1966).
156

See, e.g., Kwoczka v. Dry Dock Say. Bank, 52 Misc. 2d 67, 275

N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1966), where the court was requested to
return a sum of money to
by her late husband. The
because to do so it would
action.
157 53 Misc. 2d 225, 278

plaintiff's account from a Totten Trust created
court stated that it could not return the money
have to cancel the trust, an essentially equitable
N.Y.S.2d 137 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1967).
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

The court granted judgment for the defendant, holding that it
lacked jurisdiction since plaintiff's claim was equitable in nature. 58
The court found that Article 10 of the Debtor and Creditor Law
dealing with fraudulent conveyances was, both in origin and upon
principle, equitable in character. Plaintiff's request for the ordinary
remedy of money damages as opposed to the equity remedy of
setting the conveyance aside, the court stated, did not alter the
basically equitable nature of the action.
The present case suggests a reminder to attorneys that they
be especially clear in framing their pleadings so as to accurately
reflect the nature of the remedy they seek. Furthermore, in a
case where the law-equity distinction is somewhat beclouded, the
practitioner should not rely on form pleadings, but, rather, should
draft his own. As an additional safeguard against mistakenly
dismissing an action where the pleadings lack clarity, the court
might ask the plaintiff's attorney to submit a signed memorandum
affirming that he is requesting solely legal relief, before deciding
on whether there is jurisdiction over the subject matter.
MVAIC
MVAIC:

No exception to filing requirements except those found
in statute.

In Jones v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation,"59 the Court of Appeals held that the failure of an injured
party to file a claim with MVAIC within ninety days after an
accident with an uninsured driver, as prescribed by Section
608(a) of the Insurance Law, 50 absolutely precludes recovery from
MVAIC. Thus, the only exceptions to this ninety-day filing
requirement are those expressly provided in the statute, viz., "where
the qualified person is an infant or is mentally or physically incapacitated or is deceased, and by reason of such disability or
death is prevented from filing as provided ... ." 161
This decision upholds an inequity of the law. Section 668
provides three sets of filing requirements to cover three situations:
first, where the victim is in an accident with an uninsured driver;
1s

53 Misc. 2d at 226, 278 N.Y.S2d at 140.

See Davis v. Wilson, 150

App. Div. 704, 135 N.Y.S. 825 (1st Dep't 1912).
'r9 19 N.Y2d 132, 224 N.E.2d 883, 278 N.Y.S2d 382 (1967).
160
For a general discussion of filing requirements for recovery from
state accident funds (New York as well as others) see generally Annot.,
2 A.L.R.3d 760 (1965). For a general discussion of MVAIC see generally
Note, MVAIC Six Years Later-A Practical Appraisal, 39 ST. JoH 's
L. REv. 321 (1965).
'6 N.Y. Ixs. LAw § 608.

